Background Paper for ActionAid
Mark Curtis, September 2008
SUMMARY
This paper shows that overseas aid to agriculture – rich countries’ spending that is supposed to increase food security in developing countries – has long failed to sufficiently help poor farmers and has often made them poorer. The context is where around 923 million people are undernourished, a figure which has increased by 75 million due to the current food price crisis. Over 2 billion people – a third of the world’s population – endure a lack of essential vitamins and minerals even when they consume adequate amounts of calories and protein.
Part one of this paper shows:
Agricultural aid levels have collapsed over the past three decades as hunger has risen in many countries
Donors are now spending only half as much in real terms on agricultural aid as in 1980 – $3.9 billion in 2006 compared to $7.6 billion in 1980. Aid to agriculture now accounts for just 3.4 per cent of aid budgets even though 75 per cent of the world’s poor live in rural areas.
Declining funds are not spent in countries where most hungry people live
Agricultural aid is very poorly targeted:
The international target of halving the number of hungry people will not be met
The UN’s Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) projected, before the onset of the current food price crisis, that the world could meet the Millennium Development Goal of halving the proportion of hungry people in the world – from 20 per cent in 1990 to 10 per cent in 2015. However, the World Food Summit goal of halving the number of hungry people in the world is likely not to be met – by 2015: there will be still be 582 million undernourished people in developing countries.
Donors’ current ‘aid effectiveness’ agenda does not address these issues
The process that donors began with the Paris declaration on aid effectiveness in 2005 ignores the major issues raised in this report. The declaration says nothing about ongoing aid conditionality (the practice of using aid to push market liberalization reforms), or crucial aid quality issues such as prioritizing assistance to countries where hunger is deepest. It also says nothing to imply that there is any particular urgency about transforming international aid to agriculture.
Part two of this paper shows:
Donors’ spending focus within agricultural aid budgets bears little relation to the needs of poor farmers while critical areas of funding have been massively cut
Major changes in the types of agricultural aid provided over the past three decades are to the detriment of small farmers. Donors have cut their aid for activities that academic studies show reduce hunger the most. Aid in support of ‘structural adjustment’ programmes – ie, agricultural liberalization and privatization – has massively increased, and has been at the expense of support for critical areas:
Donors know little about the impact of their agricultural aid. What is known suggests that they have done almost nothing to promote global food security. Recent aid reviews of the World Bank, European Commission and DFID show huge deficiencies in aid quality.
Many donors take very few steps to evaluate the performance of their agricultural aid. The evaluations that do exist often show grave deficiencies and, in the case of the World Bank and the EC, amount to devastating indictments.
- A recent review of agricultural aid during 1991-2006 from the World Bank – the largest donor to agriculture – concludes that projects have not helped countries develop a long-term strategic approach to food insecurity or helped countries sufficiently increase agricultural productivity.
- An evaluation of the European Commission’s aid to rural and agricultural development covering the period 1995-2005 concludes that, despite some successes, EC aid is ‘limited… fragile… or hardly visible’ while projects ‘fail to achieve significant global impact’.
Agricultural aid programmes are plagued by poor management and coordination among donors
Aid to agriculture shows growing overlaps and duplication among donors with the proliferation of separate global and regional initiatives and separate funds, despite the decline in overall aid. The fact that various donors have been pursuing separate agricultural strategies in developing countries has prompted the then World Bank director for agriculture and rural development to accuse donors of ‘havoc and confusion and waste’.
Part three of this paper shows:
Aid used to push agricultural liberalization has deepened hunger in many developing countries and left their agricultural sectors worse off
Agricultural aid has for the past 25 years been used to promote ‘liberalized’ agricultural policies in developing countries, entailing the privatization of state agencies and liberalization of agricultural trade. This has been done either in specific aid projects, by making aid conditional on promoting liberalization policies or by the general ‘advice’ that has accompanied aid programmes. Numerous studies show that hunger and poverty have deepened in many countries as a direct result. The World Bank has been shown to have an ideological commitment to a failed economic model which, a recent internal review shows, has rarely been based on actual country analysis.
Despite some of their claims, donors are continuing to use aid to push a failed economic model on the poorest countries
Despite considerable historical evidence that state-led approaches can work best in agriculture, donors retain their fundamental commitment to agricultural liberalization with an active role for the state firmly off the agenda.
- Although the use of conditionality has declined – since there is little left to privatize or liberalize in agriculture – research for this report shows that World Bank aid conditionality is continuing to be used, in countries such as Rwanda, Ethiopia and Burundi, to press countries to liberalize their agricultural sectors.
- The European Union’s Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) are a new form of aid conditionality, whereby entire aid programmes are conditional on developing countries promoting a package of liberalization policies. Weak safeguards mean that small-scale farmers will be exposed to sudden competition from EU agricultural imports. EU strategy is to create larger markets for European companies, a goal on which officials have often been explicit.
Aid, together with policy ‘advice’ and pressure accompanying it, is promoting ‘high-tech’ farming that primarily benefits Western businesses
Agricultural aid directly promotes agribusiness by donors pressing for ‘high-tech’ solutions to global hunger in their policy advice to developing countries. The increased use of fertilizer, chemicals and Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) is seen by most donors as part of the ‘solution’ to global hunger; behind this, lies an industry of manufacturers, scientists linked to corporations and foundations. USAID is leading the push for countries to adopt GMOs in their farming while the World Bank is strongly supportive, despite evidence that biotechnology companies have yet to introduce a single GM crop that actually increases yield.
The global food system is dominated by a small number of companies but even in the rare instances when donors recognize there is a problem they continue to do nothing to address it. Donors such the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID), for example, continue to promote completely insufficient voluntary codes of behaviour for companies to abide by (or not).
Donors have chosen to avoid focusing their agricultural aid on the hundreds of millions of smallholder farmers
Donors’ agricultural aid has prioritized the interests of global corporations over smallholders; yet most of the world’s 450 million farmers are smallholders, and 85 per cent of them cultivate less than two hectares. In most developing countries, small-scale farming needs to be at the central of agricultural strategy.
- ‘Low-input’ agriculture – farming that does not rely on expensive inputs such as fertilizer or chemicals – has essentially been bypassed by donors. Research on organic farming, for example, is non-existent in most developing countries and accounts for just 1 per cent of rich countries’ total research budgets.
- Donors have long prioritized the promotion of export crops rather than food staples, yet domestic markets are generally much bigger than export markets for poor countries. Many macro-economic reforms of the type promoted by donors are not targeted on, and are not even intended to affect, millions of smallholders who produce for home consumption.